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Summary
The accepted theory of cartel behavior is reviewed both graphically and
algebraically, a monopolistically competitive industry and firm serving as
the model. The theory is then criticized on four points: inattention to the
capacity of firms; casting a dynamic problem as if it were one of comparative
statics; failure to deal with entry by new firms or investment rivalry among
existing firms; and failure to deal with internal enforcement devices by a
cartel. Each point, when incorporated into the standard theory, is shown to
alter significantly the received conclusions about cartel behavior.

We can stand a good deal of cheating better than
competition.
John Murray Forbes, President of the Chicago,
Burlington & Qunicy Railroad in the late 19th
century.
Modern economic theory has in principle agreed with Adam Smith
that "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." But modem theory has
further directed its powerful tools to the task of elucidating what the
results of such conspiracies are likely to be both for consumers and for
the conspirators. In doing so, it has offered predictions which might
have surprised Adam Smith, viz., that competition is inevitably a stronger
force than collusion. The means of establishing this hypothesis are
elegant, and there is also much of substance to admire in the theory.
These attributes do not, however, prevent the received theory of collusion
from being incomplete. That the hypothesis is_ misleading is the central
claim of this chapter and, in a more thoroughgoing way, of this entire
work.
I shall address myself in section I to an examination of the theory
as it is currently expounded in most microeconomics textbooks. There
has, of course, been more advanced work on collusion; these works are
not dealt with explicitly here, although a few are mentioned. The reason
for this neglect is that the advanced literature has not really questioned
the tenets of the simpler theory. Tlie received theory—which I shall
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937),
p. 130.
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call the primitive theory of cartels—is treated both graphically and
algebraically in the first section. Section II is a critique of the
received, primitive theory laid out in the first section.
I.
There are, in the literature, two central propositions made regarding
cartels. The first is that in an industry whose unfettered condition is
competitive there is an incentive to collude in order to establish a
collective monopoly. This incentive can be demonstrated for the case of
a perfectly competitive industry which is initially in long-run equili-
briiim, as is the case at P
,
Q in figure 1. Each of the n firms in the
industry is producing q = Q /n at the point at which the market price
is just equal to both the marginal and average costs of production. Thus,
economic profit for each firm is zero. The corresponding decisions for
the individxial firm are shown in figure 2. If the firms in this compe-
titive industry, now at a long-run equilibrium, were to get together and
agree to restrict industry output to Q = nq^, then they might all share
in the resulting monopoloy profits, represented by the shaded area in
figure 1. For the individual firm, belonging to the collective monopoly
involves adhering to the collectively-determined quota, q^, which is, of
course, less than its output in the competitive case, q , as shown in
figure 2. At the industry level the restricted output has also resulted
in the higher market price, P
,
m
The second proposition about cartels in this primitive theory is
that, once the collustion is established, there is an irresistible
incentive for each member of the cartel to cheat, that is, to violate
its quota. In figure 2 it is obvious that the firm is making greater
ATC
Figure 1
mc
m c
Figure 2
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profits at P
, q than it was at P , q . But it is also obvious that
for the market price P the profit-maximizing output rate for the firm
m
is not q but q*. Since it is true that each firm perceives this incen-
tive to cheat on its quota, each firm will surreptiously produce q*.
The inevitable result is an excess market supply at the cartel price
P equal to n(q* - q^)» which drives the market price down to its old
competitive rate. That is, the competitive equilibrium will dominate
any other in this indiistry.
These propositions can also be shown to hold for the slightly
more complicated and more realistic case of an imperfectly competitive
industry. Imagine that a firm's situation in such an industry is
represented by the conditions in figure 3. The firm's marginal costs
la
are assumed to be constant and equal to K. As usual, the firm
perceives two different demand curves facing it: one is simply its
market share demand curve, D . Price and quantity pairs read off D
are for the case in which all firms in the Industry are quoting the
same price. Associated with D is a marginal revenue curve, >!R . The
m m
horizontal sum of the D 's for all firms in this Imperfectly competi-
tive industry would give the Industry demand curve. In addition to
D each firm also perceives the more elastic demand curve, D , . This
m "^ 1
second curve tells the firm what the demand for its product will be
when the firm alters its price while all other firms in the industry
maintain theirs. The commonly accepted explanation for the greater
very similar results would result from assuming the usual upward-
sloping firm supply or marginal cost cur-ze. The constant case Is chosen
here for several reasons: It is easier to deal with without significantly
altering the results; and It is consistent with the notion of economies
of scale, which are thought by many to have been the short-run rule In
late 19th century.
5.
mc=K.
q q
q - q = the increase in sales occasioned by the secret
price cut and due to increased purchases by old
customers or first purchases by customers new to
the industry,
q' - q = the increase in sales attributable to customers
stolen from other firms in the industry.
Figure 3
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elasticity of D is that, when the firm secretly cuts its price, all
others holding theirs at the higher level, it increases its sales from
two sources. The lower price not only encourages old customers to
increase their purchases or new customers to enter the market but also
attracts to the cuttng firm some customers who are switching from
another firm in the industry to the cutter. As a very rough approxi-
mation, these two groups may be seen in figure 3. The firm cuts its
price from P to P', all other firms maintaining P, and increases its
sales fromq to q'. Note that this increase is clearly greater than
what would have been the increase in sales had all firms cut their
price from P to P'. In this latter case the firm's new sales would
have been simply q. It is the presence of output heterogeneity and
consequent brand loyalty among consumers which necessitates the
theoretician's positing this second, more elastic, demand curve, D .
A further point worth noting is that, while D is, in the short-run
m
at least, assumed to be given and fixed, D is but one of a family of
demand curves which pass through each point on D and tell the firm
m
how much it can sell for any secret price cut whatever the price
quoted by all the other firms in the industry.
In figure 4 the firm is in a long-run equilibrium, in which price
is equal to average costs, the industry is charging P^ for its output;
and the firm pictured is selling q , with no incentive either to charge
a different price or to alter its rate of sales. Each firm is earning
zero economic profit.
Now suppose that the firms in the industry undertake to form a
cartel. Is there an incentive for the firm to join? By restricting
7.
Figure 4
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total industry output through the assignment of quotas to each firm,
the industry-wide price may be raised. For the firm the situation is
again shovzn in figure 4, By accepting the quota q , for which marginal
cost equals marginal revenue from the market share demand curve, the
output price rises to P with the result that economic profits in the
amount of the shaded areas are earned by each firm. Therefore, there
is an incentive to enter into a cartel or collective monopoly in an
imperfectly competitive market.
In figure 5 the firm is shown at the price, P
,
and output, q^,
which have been determined to be the joint profit-maximizing ones for
the cartel. The firm's average cost curve is labelled ATC, and its
profits at the cartel price are indicated by the shaded rectangle
labelled A. Can the firm do better than this under the circumstances?
The answer is that the firm could increase its profits by disregarding
both the cartel price and the firm's quota. The crucial assumption
for this to be true is that the firm believes that it can successfully
offer a secret price reduction which its co-conspirators will not
immediately discover and attempt to match. In figure 5 it is clear
that even the slightest shading of the cartel price will increase the
firm's profits. Given that all the other firms are expected to con-
tinue to quote P
, what is the optimal price for the cheater to offer?
That optimum is P * for which quantity MR. = K. The profits which
the cheater earns at this combination (P-,*, q,*) are labelled B and
are clearly greater than the profits— the rectangle A—which accrued
from loyalty to the cartel. Thus, the second proposition about
2
The possibility that B < A will be addressed later.
ate
inc=K
Figure 5
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cartels—that there is an incentive to cheat once the collusion is
established— is as true for an imperfectly competitive market as it
is for the perfectly competitive case. It should also be evident that,
because of the validity of the second proposition, the competitive
equillbrixnn dominates in this market structure just as it did in the
previous case. There are two different means of establishing this in
the present case. Cue might assume Initially that what is evident
to the firm sketched in figures 4 and 5 is equally evident to all
firms in this market. Therefore, they will all violate both the car-
tel price and their quotas. The result will be an excess market
supply. The market price will drop until the firms have no further
incentive to alter their prices, a situation which in the short-run
looks, for the firm, like the one in figure 6 and in the long-run like
that at (P
, q ) in figure 4. Alternatively, and perhaps more
realistically, one might assume that the advisability of cheating is
obvious at first only to one firm. Only after some time does the
non-adherence of one member become obvious to the others, who, in the
primitive theory, take action against the cheater by matching his
discount. What happens next is shrouded in mystery. It seems just
as likely that the triiant will return to the fold as that he—or
someone like him—will cut his price again and initiate a new round
-11-
of secret discount/matching, ending in the competitive equilibrium.^
I shall return to this possible ambiguity in the following section.
Let us assume that the market share demand curve, D
,
can be
m
written as
(1) P^ = a - 3q^,
that is, as a linear demand curve with intercept a. and constant slope
3. It follows that the more elastic demand curve D , which gives the
demand for the firm's output when it alone alters the price, all other
firms holding their constant, may be represented by
(2) p^= a- 3q^- y(q^- q^)
.
with a > g and Y > 0, 3 > C. And assume that marginal cost is constant and
eqxial to K. Let us suppose that the firm, which knows all these facts
about its costs and demand, enters into a collusion with the other firms
in its imperfectly competitive industry' so as to maximize the joint
profits of the cartel members. What will the firm's share of those
profits be? Let tt represent that amount. We know that by definition
m
3
The issues raised by this alternative assumption of an initial lone
cheater are perhaps the most perplexing in all the theory of cartels.
As will be seen below, two attempts have been made to extend the
primitive theory from the basis of this assumption. George Stigler
in his 'Theory of Oligopoly' has asked when a member of a cartel can
justly infer that one of his co-conspirators is cheating. MacAvoy
and Orr have attempted to define the optimal way for the loyal members
to band against a cheater. Neither of these is entirely satisfactory.
There appear to have been several instances in the history of collusion
in which a cartel discovered a cheater, matched the cut for a time,
and then returned all together to the monopoly price.
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(3) TT = TR = TC
m ni m
= p q - p K
mTa m
Therefore, substituting (1) into (3), we get that
To find the profit-maximizing output, q *, we know that we need to
3Tr ™
find that output for which -;: = and for which the second-order
condition is also satisfied. Performing these calculations on (A)
gives the following
:
for which the associated price from D is
m
(6) p^* = ^_
Thus, substituting (5) and (6) into (4) gives
m 4p
We must novj inquire as to whether the firm could do better than
IT * by not adhering to its quota, q *, and the cartel price, p *. I
shall define the profits from cheating as being tt , as follows:
(8) IT. = TR^ - TC.
1 i 1
= P^q^ - q^K.
— J 1—
From the formula for D., equation (2) above, we have that
(9) p. = a - Bq^ + aq^ - gq^
= a - q^(6 - a) - yq^.
\le should very much like to have that particular D which passes
through the point (p *, q^*) on D since it is from that initial point
that decisions about adherence versus non-adherence will be made. If
V7e substitute from (5) into (9), we shall not only get the D we seek
but also make p. a function of q and of the parameters a, 6, and y.
This substitution gives
(10) p, ^ . - "
- ^y° - ^>
- rq.
=
ctg + gK + gy - yK
23 " '^^i
T <- /11^ rp oB+gK + ay - yK ,Let (11) T = —x-r—^ ^ and now
substitute into (10) in order to get
(12) p^ = T - yq^.
Since the slope of the more elastic demand curve is greater than that
of the market share demand curve, I.e., since y > 3, the intercept
along the horizontal axis must be greater for D than for D , i.e..
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T < a. From the equation (12) we can derive the formula for the
marginal revenue cur\'e associated with D., namely
(13) MR^ = T - 2Yq^.
The cheater can maximize his profits—assuming all other firms
continue to quote p *—by choosing that output, in violation of his
quota, q^*, for which
(lA) MR = MC = K
Setting (13) equal to marginal cost gives
(15) ,^* . i^
which is clearlv analogous to (5), the formula for q *. Furthermore,
m
the optimal price to charge for the disloyal firm is
T + K
(16) p * =
i 2 '
4
This is graphically obvious but can be sho\im through induction as
follows
:
nn T = ctS + SK + gy - yK
T > a implies that
aS + SK + ay - yK
-T3 ^ '''
ag + SK + aY - yK > 2a6
Y(a - K) > e(a - K)
We have established that T > a implies that y > S., which is what we
have assumed to be the case for D to be more elastic than D . Since
T > a implies something else whicn we know to be true, T > a must be true.
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which is, of course, the counterpart to p * as given in equation (6).
From (15) and (16) it is a simple matter to calculate ti.** the optimal
profits for the cheater. This quantity is
Now, the question the cheater must ask hiniself is whether t.* > tt *.^ 1 m
Only if it is, is the cheating worth undertaking.
Recall that from (11) T was defined as follows:
(11) T =
ccg + BK 4- gy -J
2p
Therefore,
(18) (t - K) = <g -^ -^11^ - ^^
Thus, the optimal profits for the cheater may be written
(15) . . =
(^^y)\a.K)'
163 Y
This clearly facilitates comparison of cheating profits with those at
the cartel optimum. If disloyalty is to be preferable to loyalty,
then TT.* > TT *, and this implies that
i m
*^
(20) (3 + Y)^(ct - K)^ ^ (a - K)-
les^Y ^e
Upon simplification this inequality becomes
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(21) (3 - y)^ > 0.
It is clear that the only instance in which this condition will not be
satisfied—that is, the only circumstances under which it will not pay
to cheat rather than to remain loyal— is if S = y. This can occur
only if there is no laonopolistic competition, that is, only if D. and
D are the same, and there is, therefore, no product heterogeneity.
Given our assumption that y i"^ 6> vis., y > 6, profits from cheating
will be greater than those from adhering to the joint-profit-maximizing
cartel price and its production quota.
Suppose that cheating occurs and that the cartel responds by quoting
the same price as does the cheater. Could some member then quote a new,
still lower, price and thereby earn greater profits? The answer is yes.
Cuts will continue until the following conditions are simultaneously
satisfied:
(22) Pi = P^ = P*
(23) q. = q^ = q*
(24) MR^ = K.
It is only under these conditions that there is no incentive for any
firm to charge a different price from that charged by any other firm.
Clearly such a point would be the short-run equilibrium for any monop-
olistically competitive industry. How might we describe such an
equilibrium? We have expressions for the conditions (22) - (24) so
it is no trouble to derive the price and quantity configurations for
-17-
the competitive equilibritnn. From the equilibrium conditions and
the expression for MR , we have
(25) q* = °' -
^
+ Y
and
(26) p* -
g + ^
5
The solution given here for the short-run equilibrium for an imper-
fectly competitive industry exhibits, as does no other treatment kno^^m
to me, the often-expounded fact that the equilibrium price for this
sort of industry will be somewhere between what it would have been
had the industry been either monopolistic or perfectly competitive.
We know that if this industry were perfectly competitive price would
equal marginal cost, i.e., P * = K. We have seen (equation (7)
above) that if the industry v;ere a monopoly, P * = —^—^ • Th^ usual
intermediate microeconomic contention is that
p * > p* > p . ,^ ^+1 > £I_±ii > K.
m c 2 Y + 6
On the assumption that y ^ 6i it is an easy natter to verify these
inequalities. It is a matter worth noting and worth bearing in mind
in what follows that one of the rich lodes of monopolistic competition
theory as yet uranined has to do with the relationship between D and
D
, i.e., between y and g, the slope parameters for those demand
cur-zes. A moment's reflection clearly suggests that y and are not
independent. The degree to which one firm's output is distinguishable
from that of another firm is among other things what determines the
relationship between y and 2. And clearly this distinguishability is
something over which the firms' themselves have some control. An ex-
ample of this point is given by the now-booming running shoe industry.
There are some firms who boldly distinguish their product from the
familiar three stripes of Adidas. Nike, for instance, uses a large
yellow swoosh on the side of their shoe. Other manufacturers have
similarly distinctive marldngs on their shoes. However, there are
some manufacturers e.g.. Sears, K-Mart, and J.C. Penney, who choose to
minimize the difference betiveen their product and that of Adidas by
putting two or four stripes on their product. Interestingly, the
firms seeking distinction charge very similar prices to those of
Adidas. Those trying to camouflage differences usually offer a lower
price than does Adidas.
-18-
The relationship between the incentive to collude and the incen-
tive to cheat may perhaps helpfully be viewed with the aid of the
accompanying graph, figure 7. I have graphed profit on the vertical
axis as a function of price, on the horizontal cixis. The parabola
marked rr (p ) is the profit contour along the market share demand
m m
curve, D . Initially profits are negative for very low prices although
they are even then an increasing function of price. Only when price has
been raised to that point at which marginal revenue is equal to marginal
cost—at the price p *—are profits at a maximum. Beyond this point
any attempt to boost the price still further results, of course, in a
diminution of profit. Recall that, since tt (p ) is the profit contour'^ m '^m ^
associated with the demand curve D , that contour represents those
situations in which all the firms are charging the same price. There
is, in addition, a series of parabolas mounting the left side of the
TT (p ) contour and labelled tt. (pj). This series of contours correspondsmm 1 1
to the various deamnd curves D^ which pass through any given point along
D
. I have drawn in only three of these ^ . (pw for very specific
reasons. frlCpI) passes through the peak of the t: (p ) hill. It there-
fore corresponds to the more elastic demand curve which, in figure 5,
I have drawn through the joint-profit maximizing point (p , q ) . A
cheater operating along his own D from that point is thus moving along
the parabola t'(p!). The third of thse contours, t:*(p*), reaches its
peak exactly on the grand contour ^ (p ) . Note that all of the other
m m
lesser parabolas reach a maximim to the left—i.e., at a lower price
—
2 2
"• (p ) . The second contour, tt. (pt), is simply intermediate between themm ii
other two.
19,
TT (P )m m
IT (p ) : the profit contour along the market share demand curve, Dmm ° m,
TT (p.) : the profit contour alone the cheater's demand curve, D.
,
at any given price along D .
m
Figure 7
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We can now run through the life history of a cartel with the aid
of figure 7. Suppose the cartel sets the joint profit-maximizing price,
p^*, and therefore assures each firm in this monopolistically competi-
tive industry profits in the amount tt *. The cheater perceives that he
can do better than this. By moving along his own demand curve, D
,
quoting a lower price, and violating his quota, the treacherous firm can
select the price p.* which, given that all others are still charging
p *, will earn him greater profit, tt ' . When he is discovered, the
cartel members—I assume—match his price. This shifts the cheater's
demand curve D. down along D to p. and places him back on the tt (p )
i " m '^i ^ m '^m
nowat the point at which it intersects with n't'(pT). All firms are
charging p , and each firm is earning profits in the amount tt . This
is clearly less than what the firm earned when the cartel was estab-
lished— TT *--rand when it first undertook to cheat
—
tt
. . Let us now
m i
assume that from the position (tt
, p ) it does not occur to the firms
to return to the letter of the cartel agreement, i.e., to return to
production of their quotas and to charging the joint profit-maximizing
price. Rather they propose to remain at (tt
, p ) for the time being.
Assuming the initial cheater still desires another go at maximizing
his profits, what will he now do? 3y cheating yet again he can earn
slightly more than he could by remaining loyal. He therefore quotes
2 2 1
a still lower price, p , and earns ^r , a greater sum that tt . When
this round of deceit is uncovered, the cartel again matches the lower
price. The cheater's demand curve is pushed down D to pt, which, I
assume for simplicity's sake, is equal to p*. The new cheating profit
contour Tr*(p*) reaches its maximum on tt (p ) at this point. There ism m
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no further incentive to cheat: by charging a price different from p*
—
assiiming all other firms hold fast to that rate—the cheater will receive
less profits than '^*. Thus, the industry is at that point in short
run equilibrium. A symmetrical sort of tale regarding the incentive
to collude giving way to the incentive to cheat can be told in profit-
quantity space rather than profit-price space. This is done in figure
8.
In these tellings, whether algebraic cr graphic, there seems to be
no way out of the conclusion that cartels are not stable. The incentive
to cheat is stronger than the incentive to collude. The empirical pre-
dictions of this theory are fairly straightforward—firms in essentially
competitive industries will try to form collective monopolies, but those
collusions will be relatively short-lived. If one were to investigate
such an industry, one would observe an initial rise in market price and
a lowering in the production of each firm in the industry. Simultaneous
with these changes the profits of each firm would increase, perhaps as
reflected in the prices of the firms' shares quoted on a stock exchange.
Shortly thereafter— the timing here is uncertain—some firm will have
discovered that it can do better than by scrupulously remaining loyal.
Thus, one would observe, if not the actual cheater, that the cartel
price was being shaded and that the amount of output being offered for
sale in the industry exceeded the sum of the individual firms' quotas.
The cartel agreement would then be, like the Danish laws in Hamlet's
time, "more honored in the breach than in the keeping," and prices
would be observed to fall to something like the competitive level,
output also increasing.
22.
^m^'^m''
^^^ profit contour along the market share demand curve, Dm m m
'^i'-^i'*
""'^^ profit contour along the cheater's demand curve, D.,
at any given price along D .
m
Figure 3
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II.
The received theory of cartels seems to be weak on four points.
First, it pays no attention to problems of capacity among the member
firms. Second, the model, although one of comparative statics, attempts
to deal with an essentially dynamic problem: the movement from the
joint-profit-maximizing price and quantity to the competitve static
framework some crucial asstanptions have been made but left unstated.
When stated, they appear to me to be unsatisfactory. Third, the
primitive theory of cartels ignores the possibility of entry into the
market or of investment rivalry among the colluders, and thus skirts
the longer term problems which may face attempts to maximize profits
jointly. And lastly the theory grants to the economic agents in the
model a selective rationality for which there is no basis either in
theory or in fact. By the term "selective rationality" I mean ration-
ality with regard to some but not all of the aspects relevant to a
given problem. Kow this notion applies to the members of a cartel
organized under the received theory will be made clear below.
The first criticism mentioned has to do with the productive
capacity of the individual firms involved in the collective monopoly.
In order for a cheater to accomodate an increase in demand for his
services, he must have either excess capacity;- at hand or a relatively
high elasticity of supply of capacity. Let '.is deal with the second
possibility first, using a railroad involved in a cartel as an example.
Clearly, in the short-run, a firm which wishes to transport more goods
than allotted him by the cartel must have spare rolling stock at hand.
Suppose it does not. Then it can only accomodate more customers by
-24-
other means. It might, for example, purchase more cars from its
suppliers or, alternatively, it might hire some rolling stock from
some other railroad which has spares on hand. The firm might also
think of transferring some of its ovm rolling stock from some other,
less profitable routes to the route upon which it desires to cheat.
Lastly, if possible, it might attempt to load its existing cars
more densely at the cost of this increased weights' heightening wear
on the rails and boosting the fuel requirements of the locomotives.
These alternatives are all costly to one degree or another. An impor-
tant point beyond that is that the visibility to the firm's rivals of
these various means of increasing capacity differs. Purchase or
rental is very likely to be evident to the firm's co-conspirators
and thus to put them on their guard. The other capacity-incrementing
schemes are less visible to rivals but also fraught with other prob-
lems, like precise calculations of profit rates on competing routes.
And against these differing supply costs there is the likelihood of
the cheating 's not succeeding.
The point to which these examples are directed is that cheating
on a collusive arrangement is not costless, as the received theory
implicitly assumes. Rather, the decision to violate one's quota is
a decison to incur certain costs, some of which appear to be related
to the desire to accomodate the extra-quota business through an in-
crease in capacity and others of which appear to be related to hiding
this decision from the cheater's co-conspirators.
The suggestion here is that the primitive theory of cartels im-
plicitly assumes that the supply of capacity to the firms in the cartel
-25-
is perfectly elastic. This seems as if it might be a restrictive
asstmption and urges one to investigate the effect on the received
model of assuming the contrary, namely, a capacity constraint being
imposed on the members of the collusion. This possibility is shown
in figure 9. There the capacity K of the firm corresponds to output
q. At that level of output the marginal cost curve displays a dis-
continuity by becoming exactly vertical. The figure is drawn so
that the marginal revenue curve associated with the firm's market
share demand cur^/e passes through the discontinuity in the marginal
cost curve. This would be the case if that cartel were fortunate
enough
—
given the level of industry demand and each firm's capacity
—
to assign as a quota to one firm exactly the upper limit of what the
firm is capable of producing. If all the members are in the same
position, that is, for all firms q = q^*, the cartel will be abso-
lutely stable in the short-run. The desire to cheat may be there, but,
in the short-run, the wherewithal to do so is missing. Thus, it
would appear to be the case that the less elastic the supply the more
likely the cartel is to be stable.
Let us explore this possibility further by considering the case,
shown in figure 10, in which q > q^*; the firm has excess capacity in
the amount (q - <l*) . Clearly the firm has the usual incentive to
cheat from its initial output rate of q *. I assume that the firm
m
does so by selecting that output for which MR ' is equal to MC. As
A more realistic depiction would have the marginal cost curve begin
to rise as it approached q and thereafter become steeper and steeper.
The refinement v/hich this would allow does not \mTXs.nt the complications
which it introduces.
26.
q=q
m
Figure 9
1
P =P
q=q.=q.
Figure 10
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the discounted price of p.. Note that if its capacity were larger,
this firm would have chosen to offer a greater amount of output at an
even lower discount. As before, I assume that the cheating is dis-
covered and that the price cut is matched by the other members. This
2leads to a downward shift in D to D
.
. A new round of cuts ensues
i i
3leading to the short-run industry equilibrium along D
.
This second example confirms the prediction above that the viru-
lence of the cheating will be somewhat mitigated by the presence of
an upper bound on firm output. This is specifically true only when
q < q*, where, as before, q* is the short-run monopolistically com-
petitive output and q is the short-run capacity of the firm. Obviously
the tempering effect of this output constraint on cartel well-being
is greater the less is the difference between a particular member's
quota and his capacity.
This point suggest two others. First, if it is at all possible,
a cartel can increase its chances for success (in the short-run at
least) by so assigning quotas as to minimize excess capacity for each
member. Secondly, any event which causes a reduction (increase) in
the excess capacity of the members of a collective monopoly vd.ll in-
crease (decrease) the organization's chances for super-normal profits.
Clearly, one such event would be fluctuations in the demand for the
industry's output.
The second criticism which should be raised against the received
theory has to do with the fact that there is something too mechanical
about the fact that departures from the joint-profit-maximizing price
and qixantity inevitably lead to the short-run competitive equilibrium.
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Imagine the following happening: from the initial cartel price and
quota a member perceives the incentive to cheat and offers a secret
discount. In time he is found out, and all the other firms match the
lower price. We have seen that from this point someone now perceives
that rather than remaining at this price-quantity combination, it again
pays to cheat in that still greater profits can be earned by being dis-
loyal. But these greater profits from a new round of cheating depend
on the cheater's believing that a new price cut will not be perceived
for a time and, thus, not be matched immediately by all other firms.
Whereas these miight have been plausible beliefs just after the forma-
tion of the cartel when all were flush with the newness of the thing,
these now seem, in view of the recent experience of disloyalty and
detection, naive beliefs. Everyone will be on the lookout for cheating.
It is thus not unlikely to be quickly found out and just as quickly
matched. This fact surely reduces the incentive to embark on a new
round of secret cuts. But the crucial point is, how do these shrunken
returns from a second round of cuts compare to the profits from returning
to the original joint-profit-maximizing situation? Might it not be a
wiser thing to opt for the surer cartel profits? But then these have
been somewhat reduced in value by the discovery that cheating w-ill
occur. Still, without a return to the cartel situation the end of the
line will be the competitive equilibrium, which, while stable, returns
the least profits imaginable. It might be a wiser course to try—after
the first round of cheating is discovered and answered— to re-establish
the cartel, even though one might expect periodic cheating in the future .
John Murray Forbes, the Coston capitalist and investor in the Chicago,
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Burlington & Quincy Railroad, put the natter as follows: "We can stand
a good deal of cheating better than competition." I am not suggesting
that an episode of disloyalty will always lead to a resurrection of the
collective monopoly optimimi; merely that it might and that this possi-
bility is suggested by the same sort of reasoning which in the received
theory hastily plunges the cartel into a stable, competitive equilibrium.
The third shortcoming from which the primitive theory suffers is
its failure to deal with the possibility of entry into the market in
the long-run or of investment rivalry, also in the long-run, among the
members of the cartel. Surely the general tendency to ignore these
problems is attributable to the conclusion of the received theory that
the cartel agreen:ent can be expected to be broken in the short-run.
If, during that time period, the industry can be shown to return
inevitably to the competitive equilibrium, then the long-run equili-
brium will simply be that of a perfectly or imperfectly competitive
industry, as the case may be. On the other hand, if v/e grant the
possibility that the cartel nay be successful in restricting total
industry output and in maintaining the monopoly price in the short-run,
then it becomes evident that there may well be a distinction between
the analysis of the cartel in the different time periods.
Assume that the cartel has discovered the proper means to mini-
mize the incentive to cheat in the short-run or that, alternatively,
each firm in the collusion is operating at its capacity constraint so
The only treatment of this latter subject with which I am familiar
is that in George Stigler, The Theory of Price , 3rd ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 234-36.
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that no firm has the wherewithal to cheat. The monopoly profits
earned by the essentially coEpetitive industry under these circum-
stances will certainly encourage resources into the industry or the
existing firms to expand their capacity. Thus, the problem for a
successful cartel is how to prevent entry or investment rivalry in
the long-run. These are different matters, which is not to say that
they may not happen simultaneously. It may well be, that is, that
entrants may appear at the same time that the members of the cartel
are attempting to put additional capacity in place. Inasmuch as
these are different sorts of threats to stability in the collusion,
they require different solutions, and, for the economist interested
in modeling the collusive process, different analytical treatments.
There is not a commonly agreed-upon method of precluding firms
from competing among themselves in the size of their fi:ied capacity.
Some schemes for doing so are, however, conceivable. For instance,
the members of a cartel might designate spheres of influence for
themselves and agree not to intrude into each other's territory. The
hope would be that each fino would confine its investments to its cwn
territory and, thus, not threaten the stability of the collusion in
the commonly-served territory. This method of defusing long-run
competition is more likely to work the larger the total area seirved
by the cartel members in relation to the area over which the collusion
8
operates.
Granting territorial exclusivity was a coimnon means of promoting
stability in late nineteenth century railroad cartels, as it is in
modern industries, e.g., the hearing-aid market.
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If the distinction between firms is not territorial but has to do
instead \v-ith the range of products manufactured, then the agreed-upon
restriction on investi-.ent might be to refrain from investing in plants
designed to produce the cartelized output common to all the members.
The hope would be that the members would invest Instead in plant for
the production of its non-cartelized output. If the capital or other
fixed input happens to be used jointly to produce all of the firm's
production, then this sort of attempt to restrict investment rivalry
is not likely to be very effective.
The members of some collusions might be willing to pool their
investment funds and relinquish control over investment decisions to
9
a committee appointed by all the members of the collusion. While
this seems the ideal solution to the problem, it demands an unlikely
commitment from the colluders, viz., the sacrifice of firm autonomy.
Even if none of these solutions is possible, it must be recog-
nized by all colluders that the commitment to expansion of one's plant
is a highly visible means of signallying one's intention with respect
to the other members of the cartel. For that reason it would seem
likely to posit that investment rivalry, precisely because it is such
a strong threat to the stability of the cartel, will be undertaken
only when other events have indicated that the collusion is weakening.
That is, just as war can be taken as the signal that all other means
9Some fixed assets of the Southern Railway and Steamship Association
were jointly owned by the members of the cartel. See Thomas S. Ulen,
Cartels and P.egulation; Late nineteenth Century Railroad Collusion
and the Creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, 1978), Appendix to Ch. 2.
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of resolving a conflict have proved unsuccessful, so investment
rivalry within a cartel is probably a signal that something else has
gone wrong and that the members have chosen to give up on making the
alliance work. The power of this signal may, therefore, make it
imnecessary for there to be an explicit agreement among the members
regarding their plans to invest in fixed plant. All firms may take
this as an instrumental variable for the trust which must govern their
relations if the collusion is to work.
The cartel must also devise a strategy for discouraging entry
into its industiry. This is so because the more successful the cartel
is in the short-run in jointly maximizing profits, the more likely it
is to attract resources to the production of the cartelized product.
Entry may be extremely costly because of the size of fixed plant
involved, in combination with essential imperfections in the capital
market. If, however, there are no such constraints en a potential
investor, the commonly used scheme for discouraging entry is to
practice limit-pricing. The monopoly or collective monopoly does
not set its price so as to maximize short-run profits, there being
no surer way to attract entrants. Instead, the cartel charges a
slightly lower price, trading off short-run gain for a longer term of
market power in the industry, free from the competition offered by
entrants. It has been argued, for example, that OPEC is not charging
a price for oil which would truly maximize that cartel's short-run
profits. The reason is that such a high price would heighten the
incentive of oil consumers to adopt alternative fuel sources or of
entrepreneurs to search for as yet unknown oil deposits or of innovators
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to imdertake research in currently unpractical energy technologies
such as nuclear or solar power. To forestall these developments the
members of CPEC can be said to be practicing limit-pricing, charging
a price above the marginal and average cost of production and yet be-
low that which a monopolist would charge if he were unafraid of entry.
It has been suggested that there is no need for a collusion or
a monopolist to practice limit-pricing. This is because it can deter
entrants through the means of keeping on hand enough excess capacity
to be able to lower the output price very rapidly through expanding
output. The potential entrant, who may have begun to lay plans for
bringing resources to the industry in the belief that the monopoly
price would be maintained, may suddenly find, after the expansion of
output by the cartel or monopoly, that the price is too low to justify
his going ahead with his plans. This lowering of the monopoly price
need not, of course, be practiced time and again as new entrants
threaten. It would probably be the case that the sudden lowering of
output price need be demonstrated only once or twice for its effect
to become evident to all future entrants. ^^
Assume that in the cartelized industry capacity is an upper
bound on output and profits are given by
An appropriate analogy to the value of excess capacity in deter-
ring entry for a cartel night well be taken from the writting en
slavery. Clearly the whip need only be applied in a vicious way once
or twice for its fear to rise up in the slaves' minds and discourage
them ever after from misbehaving. Thus, one might infer that the less
the whip is used, the more effective it has been in controlling be-
havior.
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tt(x, k) = R(x) - c(x) - rk,
where x = output
k = capacity
R(x) = the revenue function
c(x) = the variable cost function, and
r = the rate of interest. -^-^
Average total costs are then given by
ATC H a(x, k) = -£121 + lis.XX
If k = X, then the firm is efficient in that costs are minimized for
a given output. In that instance,
,(^, k) = ^^ + r
Suppose now that an entrant appears and supplies output y. This
implies that total industry output is (k + y). The existing firms
have expanded output to x = k and lowered their price to P(k). (See
the accompanying figure.) With the entrant's output the industry
price falls further, to P(k + y) . If a(y, y) is the average total
cost curve for the entrant, then entiry is deterred if for all y.
\ <o-
That is, for all y, if
The notation and the accompanying graph are from Michael Spence,
"Entry, Capacity, Investment, and Oligopolistic Pricing," Technical
Report No. 131
.
(April, 1974), Institute for Mathematical Studies in
the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
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P(k + y) < a(y, y) = -^^ + r
as k Increases, P(k, y) falls for each y. For k sufficiently large,
the residual demand is zero. If we set k equal to the minimum
capacity for which entry is deterred, then the industry raaximizes its
profits subject to the following two constraints:
(1) X <_ k, which implies output is no larger than capacit^^, and
(2) k >_ k, which insures that entry is deterred.
The fourth criticism of the received theory regards what I con-
sider to be the selectively-granted rationality in the model. The
firms are given the wit to see that it pays to collude and that it
pays to cheat, but they are not allowed to have the sense to put these
two bits together in order to realize that their real problem is the
prevention of cheating. The fact that cartels break down is (and
has long been) no less evident to the members of a cartel than it is
(and has been) to economic theorists.
Before the 1890 's, when he became pre-eminent in the steel in-
dustry, Andrew Carnegie participated in price-fixing and market-share
allocating arrangements with other firms in the industry. His lieu-
tenant Charles Schwab remembered of these collusions that "...many of
them lasted a day, some of them lasted until the gentlemen could go
12
to the telephone from the room in which they were made..."
12
Jonathan R. T. Hughes, The Vital Few (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1973), pp. 239 .
-37-
Firms involved in cartels have therefore devoted resources to the
task of reducing the incentive to cheat, once a collusion has been set
up. The well-studied examples of the NCAA and the AMA both reveal that
those important collusions are alive to the incentive to cheat and
have concocted devices for reducing that incentive among their members.
The NCAA employs private detectives to check on the offers which member
colleges are tendering to prospective athletes. The series of public
letters of intent and of acceptance which a recruit to an NCAA school
must sign insure that the terms under which an offer has been made are
nominally available for inspection by the officials of the cartel as
well as by the other members. If, despite these efforts, a school
j
1
violates the implicit wage constraint imposed by the collusion, and is I
discovered to be doing so, the cartel inflicts punishment—denial of
;
I
access to lucrative television and radio contracts and to extremely
profitably post-season games—which is severe enough to lesson the I
I
incentive to cheat. A similar set of policing and enforcement devices
has been shox-m to be effective in dissuading doctors from violating
their price-fixing agreement.
M/D/216
L
m^
"iA

